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ANTITRUST LAW-BERKEY PHOTO AND ALASKA AIRLINES:
DIFFERENT ApPROACHES TO MONOPOLY LEVERAGING CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
In 1890 Congress enacted the Sherman Act! which sought to
limit unlawful monopolies or any organizations which operate to
restrict competition in the American economy.2 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act generally applies to allegations of concerted conduct
between two or more entities which results in anti-competitive
practices. 3 Section 2 also applies to concerted conduct, but more
importantly, it is the only section in the Sherman Act which pro
vides a remedy for monopoly violations caused by unilateral con
duct. Section 2 condemns the following three categories of activity:
monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and combining or con
spiring to monopolize. 4 As discussed in Section IB of this Note, the
courts have defined these terms and expanded the definitions
where appropriate. This Note focuses on the "monopolizing" and
"attempting to monopolize" aspects of section 2 and evaluates
whether monopoly leveraging is a type of "attempt" or a whole new
offense. It ultimately examines whether monopoly leveraging5
should be considered an offense under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 6
The first expressly stated offense under section 2 is monopoliz
ing. To bring a successful monopolization claim, a plaintiff must
1.

1 EARL KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES

7 n.1.1 (1978).

2. Id. at 11-12.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony
...." Id.
5. Monopoly leveraging occurs when a competitor holds a lawful monopoly in
one market and wields that monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage in a sepa
rate market. See infra note 13.
6. For another treatment of this issue, see Joseph M. Callow, Jr., Note, Cut
Throat Competition in the Friendly Skies: Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d
536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Il2 S. Ct. 1603 (1992),61 U. CIN. L. REv. 681 (1992).
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prove "possession of monopoly power in the relevant market"? and
"the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power"8 by the al
leged monopolist. The relevant market is generally the market in
which the plaintiff and defendant are competing. The scope or size
of the relevant market (as determined by the court) is extremely
important in determining whether a company possesses monopoly
power. 9 To be liable under the above formula, the actor must pos
sess monopoly power in the specific relevant market and willfully
acquire or maintain such power.
An "[a]ttempt to monopolize" is the second expressly stated
offense under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has set forth
three elements to aid lower courts in defining an attempt to monop
olize claim. First, the monopoly holder must intend to monopolize
the relevant market. 10 Second, the monopoly holder must engage
in conduct that is designed to carry out such intent,u Third, not
only must a plaintiff prove intent on the part of the allegedly unfair
competitor, but also that a dangerous probability of success exists. 12
In addition to the explicit section 2 claims of monopolization
and attempt to monopolize, this section also forms the basis for a
line of cases developing the doctrine of "monopoly leveraging."
"Leveraging" normally occurs when an entity possesses a monopoly
in one market and uses that monopoly power to gain a competitive
advantage in a separate market,13 Some courts have recognized
7.
8.

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added).
9. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The
Court had to determine whether cellophane constituted its own market or was part of a
broader market for wrapping products. If the former market analysis was applied, Du
Pont would have possessed monopoly power. The Court stated that "where there are
market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purposes, illegal monopoly
does not exist merely because the produCt said to be monopolized differs from others.
If it were not so, only physically identical products would be a part of the market." Id.
at 394.
10. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 n.28
(1985) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir.
1945».
11. Id. The intent required for a successful "attempt" claim is specific whereas
that required for a "monopolization" claim is the general intent to do the act.
12. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578
(1993); Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); see also American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) ("The phrase 'attempt to mo
nopolize' means the employment of methods, means and practices which would, if suc
cessful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though falling short, nevertheless
approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it ....") (emphasis added).
13. See Barry E. Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize - Specific Intent as Antitrust's
Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1121, 1156 (1973). "[T]he defendant has
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monopoly leveraging as an offense under section 2 while other
courts have held that leveraging does not conform to any of the
enumerated offenses. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. ,14 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit endorsed mo
nopoly leveraging and noted its requirements. I5 Twelve years later
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Alaska Airlines, Inc.
v. United Airlines, Inc., 16 became the first circuit court to openly
refute the leveraging doctrine, setting the stage for the present
controversyP
This Note will attempt to resolve the controversy between
these two circuits. Section I of this Note analyzes the legislative
history behind the Sherman Act with particular emphasis on section
2 of the Act as well as the cases prior to Berkey Photo. IS Section II
will look at the Berkey Photo decision itself including Judge Kauf
man's synthesis of the leveraging doctrine.1 9 The cases following
Berkey Photo, especially the Supreme Court cases which influenced
the Alaska Airlines court, are examined in Section lIFO Section IV
presents the facts and analysis of the Alaska Airlines opinion. 21 Fi
nally, Section V explores the validity of the two approaches to mo
nopoly leveraging, especially in light of recent Supreme Court
precedent. 22 This Note ultimately concludes that monopoly lever
aging cannot constitute an offense under the Sherman Act.
I.

BACKGROUND

Although previous cases had indicated the existence of the
leveraging doctrine?3 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 24
monopoly power in one of the markets or on one level of the distribution chain. A
violation of section 2 occurs when this monopoly power is misused in a second market,
usually to gain a competitive advantage through the leverage resulting from its domi
nance in the primary monopoly market." [d. See also Louis Kaplow, Extension of Mo
nopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 516 (1985). "Traditional
leverage theory claims that a monopolist's use of its power in its own market to control
activities in another market typically represents an attempt to spread its power to the
other market." [d.
14. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
15. [d. at 276.
16. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
17. [d. at 547.
18. See infra notes 23-73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 76-110 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 111-42 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 143-85 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 186-263 and accompanying text.
23. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

114

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:111

was the first case to clearly express25 the requirements for a monop
oly leveraging claim. 26 The Berkey Photo court held that "the use
of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another market is a violation of section 2 [of the Sher
man Act], even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the
second market. "27 Simply stated, under the monopoly leveraging
theory, if a firm has a lawful monopoly28 in one market and uses it
to gain some type of competitive advantage in a second market, the
firm would be in violation of section 2 regardless of the lack of any
intent to monopolize the second market.
The monopoly leveraging rule articulated in Berkey Photo ar
guably made it easier for a firm to fall within the violative scope of
the Sherman Act. As mentioned above, monopoly power in the
relevant shared market was traditionally required to complete a vi
olation under the Sherman Act. The monopoly leveraging doctrine,
however, created an offense for monopoly held outside the relevant
market that merely influenced this secondary market. 29 The lever
aging doctrine moved away from the stricter requirements of the
expressly stated section 2 offenses.3o Other cases had indicated that
proceeding beyond the traditional offenses would facilitate the po
licing of anti-competitive conduct,31 but Berkey Photo was the first
case to express clearly the elements of the leveraging doctrine.
The doctrine developed in Berkey Photo received considerable
24. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
25. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
26. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275-76.
27. Id. at 276. The Ninth Circuit, however, has taken issue with the "clearness" of
this doctrine, stating disparagingly that the "doctrine has only two rather loose ele
ments." Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 546.
28. Lawful monopolies generally arise when a company, through superior skill
and efficiency, gains a monopoly over competitors. See United States v. E.!. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956). The Court stated:
A retail seller may have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade because of
location, as an isolated country store or filling station, or because no one else
makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of his product, as for
example in cigarettes. Thus one can theorize that we have monopolistic com
petition in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having
power over the price and production of his own product. However, this power
... is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly.
Id. (footnote omitted).
29. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275-76.
30. Id.
31. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); United States v. Alu
minum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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treatment in the courts of appeals and district courts. 32 Some courts
responded favorably to the doctrine33 while others decided to re
serve judgment until a fact pattern presented itself that more
closely fit the paradigm for leveraging. 34 When the Court of Ap
peals for the Ninth Circuit fmally spoke decisively upon the issue35
in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,36 it became the first
circuit to reject the Berkey Photo doctrine. 37 The Alaska Airlines
court cited numerous policy considerations, which are discussed in
detail later,38 as a justification for the holding. The Ninth Circuit
also noted that the Berkey Photo methodology was overbroad be
cause it exceeded the previously outlined traditional offenses.
A.

Legislative History

The lawmakers who debated the Sherman Act never explicitly
considered the doctrine of monopoly leveraging or many of the
other doctrines which have subsequently developed under the Sher
man Act. They were more concerned with the "big picture. "39 This
fact, however, does not invalidate monopoly leveraging per se. In
stead, monopoly leveraging must be examined in the context of the
judicially created guidelines as sanctioned by Congress.
Most laws enacted by Congress require some level of interpre
tation by the courts to determine the meaning of specific language.
The broad language of the Sherman Act, however, mandates even
greater intervention on the part of the courts in defining an unlaw
ful monopoly because so many "gaps" were left in the text. 40 The
broad interpretive approach taken by certain courts finds support in
the remarks of Senator John Sherman of Ohio, the chief proponent
of the Sherman Act. Senator Sherman explained to his colleagues
32. See infra notes 12342 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
35. Originally, the Ninth Circuit had been partial to the doctrine as established in
Berkey Photo. See, e.g., M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982); cf
Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating, however,
that the court was unsure because it reserved judgment on the issue of leveraging).
36. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
37. The Third Circuit has recently followed the Ninth Circuit in rejecting Berkey
Photo's monopoly leveraging. See Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d
171,206 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993). The court stated that "[i]n
concert with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, we hold that in order to prevail
upon a theory of monopoly leveraging, a plaintiff must prove threatened or actual mo
nopoly in the leveraged market." [d.
38. See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 4142 and accompanying text.
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as follows: "[I]t is difficult to define in legal language the precise
line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left
for the courts to determine in each particular case."41 He contin
ued, stating "[a]ll that we, as lawmakers can do is to declare general
principles."42 This was certainly a broad delegation of power to the
courts.
Debate surrounding the original bill reinforced the notion that
the Act would cover unilateral conduct. Senator George Gray of
Delaware proposed amending the bill so that it would have con
demned only concerted conduct while exempting unilateral con
duct. Had his proposed amendment passed, pure monopoly and
attempts to monopolize would not have been violations. 43 Senator
Gray was concerned that the courts would have too much difficulty
in defining monopoly on a case by case basis.44 The Gray amend
ment was quickly defeated, however, thereby fortifying the Judici
ary's power to interpret and shape violations under the Sherman
Act. 45 The Supreme Court has reinforced this legislative decision,
and in fact has established section 2 as the sole basis for evaluating
unilateral conduct. 46
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act address distinctly differ
ent types of conduct. Under section 1, there must be concerted ac
tion evidenced by a "contract" or "combination."47 When such a
combination is found, a mere "restraint of trade" will constitute a
violation. 48 On the other hand, a single actor must possess a mo
nopoly or have a dangerous probability of possessing a monopoly to
violate section 2.49 This constitutes the primary difference between
section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act.
41. 21 CONGo REC. 2460 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 122.
42. Id.
43. 21 CONGo REC. 3152 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 292-93.
44. Id., reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 293.
45. Id., reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 294.
46. See infra notes 111-14 for a discussion of the proposition in Copperweld
Corp. v Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
47. 15 U.S.c. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See supra note 3 for the relevant text
of the statute.
48. Id.
49. 15 U.S.c. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See supra note 4 for the relevant text
of the statute. The Supreme Court recently stated that "[m]onopoly power under § 2
requires, of course, something greater than market power under § 1." Eastman Kodak,
CO. V. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992). Under § 1, because the
combining of firms almost certainly evidences anti-competitive behavior, less disruption
of the market is required by the courts to constitute a violation. Id. The courts conse
quently demand a greater showing of market impact when a firm acts alone. Id. ("Re
spondents' evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to
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The Senate debate also indicated that Congress desired to re
move "efficient" monopolies from the scope of the Sherman Act. 50
These monopolies are marked by the "acquisition of monopoly
power through success in fair competition."51 The United States
Supreme Court agreed with Congress that monopoly gained
through fair competition is an entirely permissible activity.52 Natu
ral monopoly receives similar permissive treatment. Natural mo
nopoly occurs in "a market in which efficiencies of size are such
that the entire output of the market can be most efficiently pro
duced by a single firm."53 Establishing the fine line between lawful
and unlawful monopolies is most difficult in the area of efficient
monopolies.
B.

Pre-Berkey Photo Supreme Court Cases

United States v. Griffith 54 could be considered the first monop
oly leveraging case. 55 The defendant theater owners possessed sin
gle theater monopolies in some towns and allegedly used this power
to eliminate competition in towns in which other theaters competed
with the defendants'.56 In Griffith, the Supreme Court held, "the
use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a com
petitor, is unlawful."57 In an even more sweeping statement, the
95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, is, however, sufficient
to survive summary judgment under the more stringent monopoly standard of § 2.").
50. 21 CONGo REC. 3151-52 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 292.
51. II EARL KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 12.14, at 376 (1980).
52. See, e.g., United States V. E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390
n.15 (1956).
53. KINTNER, supra note 51, § 12.14, at 374. Another antitrust treatise states:
In the economic sense, natural monopoly is monopoly resulting from econo
mies of scale, a relationship between the size of the market and the size of the
most efficient firm such that one firm of efficient size can produce all or more
than the market can take at a remunerative price, and can continually expand
its capacity at less cost than that of a new firm entering the business. In this
situation, competition may exist for a time but only until bankruptcy or
merger leaves the field to one firm; in a meaningful sense, competition here is
self-destructive.
CARL KAYSEN & DAVID F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 191 (1959).
54. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
55. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a definition of leveraging.
56. The complaint alleged that the defendant theater companies had agreements
with the film distributors which prevented "their competitors from obtaining enough
first- or second-run films from the distributors to operate successfully." Griffith, 334
U.S. at 103 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 107.
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Court proclaimed "monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlaw
fully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned
under [section] 2 [of the Sherman Act]."58 Although the Court's
language is broad, later decisions appear to restrict it to a point
where some type of intent is necessary to find a violation.59
Eighteen years later, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Grinnell Corp. ,60 defined the elements of a section 2 offense more
specifically as "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the rele
vant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci
dent."61 Although this language has generated significant debate
over the meaning of "willful," the Grinnell elements have become
the standard by which courts judge monopoly power under section
2.62

The exclusion of "growth or development" from the reach of
the Sherman Act was examined more fully in United States v. E.1.
du Pont de Nemours & CO.63 While discussing monopoly power in
Dupont the Supreme Court explained that an efficient monopoly,
one marked by "extraordinary commercial success,"64 was excluded
from the violative scope of the Sherman Act. 65 The Court further
held "control of price or competition establishes the existence of
monopoly power under [section] 2."66 In Dupont, E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. ("Dupont") possessed seventy-five percent of the
market share for cellophane. 67 However, Dupont did not violate
section 2 because it did not have the power to control competi
tion. 68 By requiring willful conduct and exempting natural monop
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
60. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
61. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072,
2090 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
63. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The exclusion of growth or development was also ex
amined in the legislative history section of this Note. See supra notes 50-52 and accom
panying text.
64. Id. at 390.
65. Id. at 390-91 n.15. The Supreme Court quoted the Congressional Record
where Senator Hoar explained to his colleagues that "a man who merely by superior
skill and intelligence, ... got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as
he could was not a monopolist." Id. at 391 n.15 (quoting 21 CONGo REc. 3151 (1890».
66. Id. at 393.
67. Id. at 379.
68. Id. at 392.
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oly, these later cases limited the applicability of the facially broad
rule originally announced in Griffith.
C.

United States v. Aluminum Company of America69

Judge Learned Hand wrote perhaps the most important and
widely cited United States Court of Appeals decision regarding the
question of monopoly power in United States v. Aluminum Com
pany of America ("Alcoa").70 Praised and criticized by commenta
tors 71 and relied upon by the Berkey Photo Court, it provides some
interesting insights for evaluating monopoly power. In what ap
pears to be a pronouncement about legislative intent, the court
stated, "[i]t is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect,
to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his suc
cess upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great
mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few."72 Such
an interpretation advocates a much harsher approach toward po
tential monopolists.
Judge Hand also discussed the definition of "intent" for the
purposes of section 2. With regard to a monopolization claim,
Judge Hand described the demand for specific intent as "non
sense"73 and stated "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing."74 However, specific intent is still widely recog
nized as a requirement for an attempt claim75 because there is no
established monopoly upon which to focus. With the necessity for
specific intent eliminated, it becomes easier to find violations of the
Sherman Act because courts can merely focus upon the market in
69. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). When the Alcoa litigation was appealed to the
Supreme Court, four justices disqualified themselves and a quorum was not met.
Consequently, the Supreme Court certified the case and allowed it to be heard by the
three most senior circuit judges. The opinion is therefore similar to a Supreme Court
opinion, in terms of its precedential value. PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 154
(3d ed. 1981).
70. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
71. See 2 MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN TRANsmoN 828-31 (1991). Milton
Handler has suggested that many of the principles were sound but that the language
went too far. Although the decision stood for over 30 years, it was not applied and
clarified until the Berkey Photo decision. [d. In Berkey Photo, Judge Kaufman soft
ened some of the language suggesting that it must be read in context.
72. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427.
73. [d. at 432.
74. [d. Although Professor Robert Bork disagreed with much of Judge Hand's
analysis, he did agree that there is no need for specific intent. ROBERT BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 160 (1978).
75. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
602 (1985).
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fluence. The preceding decisions became the building blocks for
the monopoly leveraging doctrine as articulated in Berkey Photo.
II.

THE BERKEY PHOTO DECISION - FACTS AND ANALYSIS

Due to its size and innovation, Eastman Kodak has sometimes
been targeted for antitrust activities under the Sherman Act.76
Many of the charges in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
can be traced back to the introduction, in 1972, of the 110 "Pocket
Instamatic" camera, now a trademark of Kodak's manufacturing.77
Kodak had the power to manufacture the only film that would work
with this particular variety of camera and this power lasted for
many months before any other companies could even compete.78
To fully understand the case, one must first recognize the rele
vant markets as follows: cameras, conventional film, photofinishing
equipment, photofinishing services, and color print paper.79 Kodak
was involved in all these markets, although it did not possess mo
nopoly power in all of them.80 Kodak controlled about sixty per
cent of the camera market and over eighty percent of the film
market evidencing its tremendous power in these areas. 81 The
plaintiff, Berkey Photo, competed with Kodak primarily in the
photofinishing services market in which Kodak clearly did not pos
sess a monopoly.82 Berkey also owned a camera company which it
sold during the litigation. 83 Berkey conceded that Kodak did not
"attempt to monopolize" these markets in the traditional section 2
sense. 84 Instead, Berkey argued that Kodak utilized its power in
the film, color paper and camera markets to gain an unfair advan
tage in the photofinishing equipment and services markets. 85 The
primary issue was whether Kodak had violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act by gaining a competitive advantage in the photofin
76. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072
(1992); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
77. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 268.
78. Id. at 269.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 269-71.
81. Id. at 269-70.
82. Id. at 271. Although Berkey brought numerous antitrust charges, for the pur
pose of this Note only those charges relating to the photo finishing services and
photofinishing equipment markets will be examined.
83. Id. at 269-70.
84. Id. at 270-71.
85. Id. at 267-68.
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ishing market (in which they admittedly did not possess a monop
oly) through the use of their monopoly in the film market.
While interpreting the background of the Sherman Act, the
Second Circuit asserted that section 2 gave the courts "a new juris
diction to apply a common law against monopolizing."86 The court
further noted that it had the latitude to decide what constitutes a
monopoly, although it recognized that "it has been difficult to syn
thesize the parts [of the Sherman Act] into a coherent and consis
tent whole."87 This difficulty in evaluating potential monopoly
offenses would later be referred to as the "tension" that underlies
the entire Sherman Act. 88 Conscious of the need to protect the
competitive spirit, the court proceeded carefully in specifying a new
doctrine.
With its role clarified, the court examined the previous judicial
treatment of monopoly power in general. Taking the lead from
Judge Learned Hand,89 Judge Kaufman, writing for the Second Cir
cuit, stated that the "[c]onsiderations of political and social policy
form a major part of our aversion to monopolies, for concentration
of power in the hands of a few obstructs opportunities for the
rest."90 The court added that "monopoly power is 'inherently
evil' "91 primarily "because it tends to damage the very fabric of our
economy and our society."92
Before addressing the issue of monopoly power in the two
market situation and the monopoly leveraging issue, the court de
veloped a working definition of unlawful monopoly. To formulate
86. [d. at 272 (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANrrrRUST
LAW 40 (1978) (quotations omitted from original».
87. Id. at 272.
88. Id. at 273. Before arriving at the actual leveraging analysis, the Berkey Photo
court addressed at length what was earlier referred to as the tension behind section 2 of
the Sherman Act. Id. Although monopoly power is recognized as inherently evil,
"courts have declined to take what would have appeared to be the next logical step
declaring monopolies unlawful per se." [d. The court noted that this apparent contra
diction indicates that the courts walk a fine discretionary line in handling monopolies.
If preservation of competition underlies the Sherman Act, then courts must not push
the scope of violations too far because eventually the lazy and weak competitor will use
the laws as a shield against its more powerful and efficient competitors. Id. Judge
Kaufman observed that at this point the antitrust laws become self-defeating and
"would thus compel the very sloth they were intended to prevent." [d. The antitrust
laws are designed to protect competition and not competitors.
89. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
90. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 273.
91. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954».
92. Id.
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this definition, Judge Kaufman combined the principles of Griffith 93
and Grinnell 94 to state "that the mere existence of monopoly power
'whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired' is in itself violative of
[section] 2, 'provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to
exercise that power."'95 This last phrase reinforces the point that
all monopolies cannot be condemned "ipso facto"96 because the law
does not want to punish the competitor who is merely more effi
cient. However, the court emphasized that "[e]ven if that power
has been legitimately acquired, the monopolist may not wield it to
prevent or impede competition."97
With a working definition of unlawful monopoly established,
the court next framed the issue precisely as "whether a firm violates
[section] 2 by using its monopoly power in one market to gain a
competitive advantage in another, albeit without an attempt to mo
nopolize the second market. "98 The court concluded that such con
duct constituted a violation even if competition in the second, non
monopoly market was "merely distorted" as opposed to being de
stroyed. 99 In support of its holding, the court analogized the case
before it to tying arrangements, where a customer is forced to buy
an additional product along with the original product, although the
additional product is not desired. 1°O Purchase of the two products is
therefore tied together and the customer is economically coerced
into buying an unwanted product, especially if the manufacturer has
93. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); see supra notes 54-59 and ac
companying text.
94. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see supra notes 60-62
and accompanying text.
95. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 (quoting Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107).
96. Id. at 275.
97. Id. at 274.
98. Id. at 275.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 275-76. The Supreme Court has condemned tying as a violation of § 1
because it is "unreasonable" per se. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112
S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (1992); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
609 (1953). Section 1 of the Sherman Act contains language that calls for the elimina
tion of all unreasonable restraints of trade. See supra note 3 for the relevant text of the
statute.
For a criticism of holding tying unlawful per se, see Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (suggesting that courts
re-evaluate their view of tying because it is not always used for monopolistic exploita
tion); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws (pt. 2),
80 YALE L.J. 195, 205 (1970) (suggesting that the exclusive function of tie-ins is not to
impede competition). But see, Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three
Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965) (criticizing the singular
focus of Bowman upon economic efficiency).
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a monopoly in the original market. 101 Thus, instead of focusing on
section 2 precedent alone, the. opinion focused on the overall policy
considerations of the Sherman Act.
The court clarified that "a large firm does not violate [section]
2 simply by reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its effi
cient size. "102 The court stressed that the focus should be upon the
use of monopoly power. 103 By excluding large firms with more effi
cient operations, the court made it difficult to determine what uses
of monopoly power were ultimately prohibited.
Upon completing an analysis of the law, the court proceeded to
apply its interpretations of the case law to the facts before it. While
the court noted that Kodak's treatment of independent photofin
ishers was "shoddy,"l04 it determined that a new trial would be nec
essary on these issues if the parties did not reach an agreement. 105
Because only Kodak produced the Kodacolor II film and 110 cam
eras,. independent photofinishers could not process this film "until
they bought new equipment and received instruction in and sup
plies for ... processing."l06 In addition, Kodak failed to provide
prior notice of the introduction of the 110 Instamatic to its competi
tors. 107 The court did not decide whether this competitive advan
tage was merely a product of superior skill or a result of Kodak's
monopoly power in other markets. lOS The court's application of the
doctrine to the facts, therefore, was left somewhat ambiguous be
101. Although this succeeds as a reinforcing argument it must be remembered
that "tying" is a § 1 offense; as such, the argument in the text merely provides persua
sive support in this particular instance.
102. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276.
103. [d. at 276.
104. [d. at 291.
105. [d. at 292.
106. [d. at 290.
107. [d. The court stated:
Kodak refused to divulge the formulae for chemicals used in the C-41 process.
Large photofinishers like Berkey preferred to buy these compounds from
chemical suppliers in bulk, both to save money and to gain flexibility. But to
be able to process Kodacolor II, they were forced to buy pre-mixed "kits"
from Kodak at twice the price.
[d.
108. [d. at 292. The court stated in pertinent part:
Kodak's ability to gain a rapidly diminishing competitive advantage with the
introduction of the 110 system may have been attributable to its innovation of
a new system of photography, and not to its monopoly power. On the other
hand, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Kodak's monopoly power in other
markets was at least a partial root of its ability to gain an advantage over its
photofinishing competitors and to sell them overpriced equipment.
[d. The court concluded by saying "[w]e cannot resolve this ambiguity." [d.
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cause the court held that a new trial would be necessary to fully
resolve the controversy.
The court spent a great of deal of time articulating the policy
arguments in favor of monopoly leveraging. What may drive the
doctrine is an underlying belief that monopoly is "inherently
evil."109 Although the court stated that large firms wielding power
based on efficiency are acceptable, the court was also wary of large
firms in certain situations. As evidence of this, the court stated that
"many anticompetitive actions are possible or effective only if
taken by a firm that dominates its smaller rivals. "110 The warning in
this language regarding larger firms provided much of the founda
tion for the monopoly leveraging doctrine.
III.

A.

PosT-BERKEY PHOTO JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Post-Berkey Photo Supreme Court Cases

Prior to examining the cases that deal directly with Berkey
Photo, it is helpful to consider subsequent United States Supreme
Court decisions. These cases do not specifically address the ques
tion of leveraging but, instead, provide evidence of the Court's ap
proach to section 2 of the Sherman Act.
To resolve any doubt left open in Berkey Photo, the Supreme
Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.1ll made it
clear that unilateral conduct is to be analyzed under section 2 of the
Sherman Act,112 The Supreme Court reasoned that "[s]ubjecting a
single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness
would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the
antitrust laws seek to promote,"113 and consequently "the [Sher
man] Act's plain language leaves no doubt that Congress made a
purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and
concerted conduct."1l4 This relatively recent language by the
Supreme Court suggests a certain amount of deference for those
firms that act unilaterally.
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,115 the
Supreme Court discussed the necessity for "predatory" conduct to
109. Id. at 273 (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954».
110. Id. at 274-75.
111. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
112. Id. at 767 n.13.
113. Id. at 775.
114. Id.
115. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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maintain a successful monopolization claim under section 2 of the
Sherman ACt. 116 The Court endorsed the necessity of "exclusion
ary" or "anticompetitive" conduct. 117 These requirements appear
to be lacking in monopoly leveraging as articulated by the Second
Circuit. llS More specifically, the Supreme Court had previously in
dicated that courts should view the Sherman Act narrowly without
overemphasizing the general purpose of the Act.1l9
Most recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the principles of
Grinnell and Aspen Skiing in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techni
cal Services, Inc. 120 In Image Technical Services, competitors had
accused Kodak of using its monopoly in the parts market for its
photocopiers to try to gain a monopoly in the service market. 121
The Court asserted that "[i]f Kodak adopted its parts and service
policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power, it will have violated [section] 2."122 The Court
found a determination of willful conduct necessary for a conviction
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
B.

Post-Berkey Photo Circuit and District Court Cases

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed Ber
key Photo in subsequent cases123 and district courts within that cir
116. Id. at 602.
117. Id.
118. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,275 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
119. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984).
120. 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090-91 (1992).
121. Id. at 2091.
122. Id. at 2090. The Court cited a string of cases to support this proposition
including Grinnell, Aspen Skiing, and Aluminum Co. of Am.
123. See Grand Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d
Cir. 1985) (stating the three elements of leveraging as follows: "monopoly power in one
market," the Griffith requirement of foreclosing competition or gaining a competitive
advantage, and "injury caused by the challenged conduct").
The court asserted that monopoly leveraging was now an embedded and estab
lished legal doctrine. Consequently, for the purposes of this discussion, the Grand
Light case provides little additional insight to that already propounded in Berkey.
Photo.
See also Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990).
1\vin Labs was a growing producer in the nutritional supplement market competing
with the giant, Weider Health & Fitness. Id. at 567. Weider Corporation also owned
the two most popular magazines dealing with health and fitness. Id. 1\vin Labs placed
the largest percentage of its advertisements in these magazines because they reached
the widest group of interested parties. Id. When 1\vin Labs' market share began to
increase, Weider denied them further advertising space in their magazines forcing them
to rely upon less popular competing magazines. Id.
1\vin Labs subsequently initiated a lawsuit and the complaint alleged in part mo
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cuit have, of necessity, followed the ruleP4
Following the Second Circuit's lead, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit also adopted the monopoly leveraging doctrine.
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit referred to the doctrine favorably, analo
gizing it to tying. 125 The court concluded that the only difference
between tying and leveraging is that, with tying, the second item is
forced upon the buyer, while with leveraging the non-monopoly
market is merely distorted. 126 Subsequent to this tangential discus
sion of the leveraging doctrine, the same court openly endorsed
monopoly leveraging in Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. Na
tional Amusements, Inc. 127 Relying primarily on Berkey Photo and
Griffith, the court held that a theater owner had a valid claim
against a competing theater owner who attempted to use its monop
oly in another geographical market to prevent competition in the
shared market. 128 The court first noted that the defendant pos
sessed lawful monopoly power in an outside market. 129 The ques
tion before the court was whether the defendant theater owner had
violated the Sherman Act despite the absence of monopoly power
in the shared market. Although the defendant did not possess mo
nopolization and attempted monopolization. The court mentioned Berkey Photo in an
alyzing the attempted monopolization claim and mistakenly claimed that Berkey Photo
involved a tying claim. Id. at 570-71. It is crucial to remember that tying is a § 1 offense
focusing more on the nature of the defendant's conduct than on the market impact. See
Anthony E. DiResta et aI., "Monopoly Leveraging": Irrelevant Dicta or a New Section
2 Challenge For Integrated Firms, in 695 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, MONOPOLI
ZATION AND TYING CASES IN THE 90's, 57, 71-72 (1991) (questioning the Twin Labs
analysis saying: "It must be pointed out, however, that such analysis by the Second
Circuit of Berkey is inaccurate. A claim of tying falls within Section 1 of the Sherman
Act - with the focus of the inquiry on the defendant's conduct, not on the market
impact."). Although this case reaffirms the Berkey Photo holding, it does so with some
confusion.
124. See, e.g., Viacom Int'! Inc. v. Time Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371, 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (recognizing the Berkey Photo doctrine but not applying it because the facts did
not warrant such action); Carleton v. Vermont Dairy Herd Improvement Ass'n, Inc.,
782 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D. Vt. 1991) (following the doctrine saying that "[t]he Second
Circuit's seminal decision in Berkey Photo is instructive").
125. White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 506 (6th
Cir. 1983). See supra note 100 and accompanying text for an explanation of tying.
126. Id.
127. 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom; G.K.C. Michigan Thea
tres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 490 U.S. 1087 (1989).
128. Id. at 136-37. National and Kerasotes competed vigorously in the Flint,
Michigan area. Kerasotes attempted to avoid competition by splitting the first run mov
ies with National. National claimed that when this attempt failed "Kerasotes began to
use its monopoly position in other geographical markets to obtain films in the Flint
market, films Kerasotes would not have otherwise been able to obtain." Id. at 136.
129. Id. at 136-37.
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nopoly power in the shared market, the court held that merely gain
ing an advantage in this market allowed the plaintiff to maintain a
c1aim.130
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reserved
judgment on the issue of monopoly leveraging in Association for
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. N. c.A.A. 131 For years, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") was the gov
erning body for men's collegiate sports and the Association for In
tercollegiate Athletics for Women ("AIAW") was the governing
body for women's collegiate sports. In 1981, the NCAA began
sanctioning women's sports and, being the more· powerful organiza
tion, drove AIAW into financial hardship.132 AIAW's complaint al
leged that the NCAA had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act
"by using its monopoly power in men's college sports to facilitate its
entry into women's college sports and to force AIAW out of exist
ence."133 The court, in language that appeared somewhat disap
proving, said "[i]n light of the substantial academic criticism cast
upon the leveraging concept, we reserve [judgment] for a case in
which decision of the question is necessary."134 The court held that
even if leveraging doctrine was applied, it could find no economic
injury based upon a "use" in women's sports of the monopoly
power held by the NCAA in men's sports.135 The Courts of Ap
peals for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have also withheld judg
ment on the monopoly leveraging doctrine.136
130. Id. at 137. The similarity in fact patterns to Griffith (competing theater own
ers) may have led the court to this result, since it relied as much upon Griffith as 'Berkey
Photo.
131. 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 580.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 586 n.14.
135. Id. at 586-88.
136. See, e.g., Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp.,
910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990). Advanced Health Care Services ("AHCS") was a com
pany providing durable medical equipment ("DME") largely to discharged patients of
Radford Community Hospital. Radford subsequently entered the DME market and
AHCS sales dropped off sharply, because many discharged patients used Radford spon
sored DME. AHCS alleged "discharge personnel unduly influenced patients to discon
tinue relations with AHCS, [and] that they steered or referred patients to Southwest
solely for the financial gain of Radford." Id. at 143. Applying leveraging analysis to the
facts of the case the court held that the leveraging claim could withstand the motion to
dismiss. Id. at 149-50. However, because the case was at an "undeveloped stage," with
respect to monopoly leveraging as an offense, the court noted that "[w]e reserve defini
tive resolution of that issue for a case in which the issue is squarely presented." Id. at
149 n.17.
See also Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990),
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Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struggled
with the monopoly leveraging issue before deciding not to adopt
the Berkey Photo holding. In M.A.P. Oil Co., Inc. v. Texaco Inc. ,137
the court recited theories of monopoly under section 2 stating
"[a]mong those forms is the theory that a firm violates [section] 2
by using its monopoly power in one market to gain an unwarranted
competitive advantage in another."138 Although this language is
somewhat ambiguous, at least one district court read it as a clear
endorsement of Berkey Photo explaining "[t]he Berkey Photo opin
ion, by virtue of its adoption in Mapp [sic], seems to have settled
the question in this circuit of whether a 'pure' monopoly leveraging
theory exists. "139 Thus the district court recognized the viability of
the monopoly leveraging doctrine within the Ninth Circuit.
However, four years later in Catlin v. Washington Energy
Co. ,140 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dispelled the no
tion that M.A.P. Oil Co. was an endorsement of Berkey Photo. The
Catlin court stated M.A.P. Oil still required an "unwarranted" com
petitive advantage, thus distinguishing it from Berkey Photo,141
which did not impose such a requirement. Furthermore, the court
questioned whether Berkey Photo itself really intended to go as far
as some people had suggested. 142 The real difficulty comes in deter
mining when the "use" crosses the line between mere efficiency and
unfair competitive advantage. The Ninth Circuit obviously strug
gled with that fundamental issue and the reservation in Catlin set
vacated, 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992). The plaintiff in this case was a supplier of dura
ble medical equipment ("DME") whose business dropped off significantly when the
Venice Hospital entered the DME market. The hospital had a special patient equip
ment coordinator who had no training in follow-up health. care. [d. at 1554. The bot
tom line was that 85% of Venice Hospital patients needing DME obtained it from the
hospital's own company. [d. at 1555. After addressing traditional attempt and conspir
acy claims, the court moved on to the leveraging claims saying "[w]hile we harbour
some reservation about the Second Circuit's conclusion that no attempt to monopolize
the leveraged market need be proved, that aspect of the monopoly leveraging theory is
not problematic in this case." [d. at 1567. At trial, the judge had actually charged the
jury upon attempted monopolization using words such as "willfully" and "conscious
objective." [d. Although the court appeared to endorse the leveraging doctrine, it was
merely dicta because it held that "[a]ll the other elements of an attempt to monopolize
under Section 2 are present in this case." [d.
137. 691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982).
138. [d. (emphasis added).
139. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1516
(E.D. Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986).
140. 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986).
141. [d. at 1346.
142.

[d.
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the stage for the decision in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines,
Inc.
IV.

THE ALASKA AIRLINES DECISON - FACTS AND ANALYSIS 143

In 1974, American Airlines attempted to gather support among
the major airlines to form a jointly owned computer reservation ser
vice ("CRS").l44 This plan failed, however, and United Airlines
and American Airlines each formed their own CRS.145 Smaller air
lines would then join these services at a per booking rate. 146 Be
cause American Airlines and United Airlines were the two largest
143. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991). cert. denied. 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). The district
court that heard Alaska Airlines issued an opinion based on Ninth Circuit precedent.
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Air Passenger Computer
Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig.), 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988). The district court
began by establishing that the Ninth Circuit had rejected a pure monopoly leveraging
doctrine where any competitive advantage gained in the second market would be
actionable. [d. at 1472. The court also cited Ninth Circuit precedent that clearly
delineated between "aggressive competition on the merits" and "anticompetitive
abuse" of monopoly power. Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d
534, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1983). This crucial distinction became the fulcrum upon which the
case turns and where the district court apparently disagreed with Berkey Photo.
In contrast to the Second Circuit's leveraging doctrine, the district court offered
different elements for a successful leveraging claim. First, "the activity complained of
must entail an abuse of monopoly power itself, as opposed to the mere use of
competitive advantages ...." Air Passenger, 694 F. Supp. at 1473 (quoting Grason
E1ec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504,1517 (E.D. Cal. 1983), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986).). Second, the advantage must be "unwarranted," a term
that generated significant analysis later in the opinion. [d. Finally, the plaintiff must
define both the original monopoly market and the market in which the defendant is
allegedly intruding. [d. The strict requirements for abuse of monopoly power and
"unwarranted advantage" distinguish this from the Second Circuit's analysis.
"Unwarranted advantage" may parallel the Second Circuit requirement of a
competitive advantage, but it could also be seen as requiring a stronger showing.
In struggling with definitions, the district court explained that "unwarranted should
be interpreted in light of existing antitrust learning pertaining to 'willful acquisition or
maintenance.'" [d. (quoting Grason, 571 F. Supp. at 1518). The court further defined
"willful acquisition or maintenance" based upon a test of unreasonableness. [d. at 1473.
If an actor's conduct involves an unreasonable restraint of trade, it constitutes willful
acquisition or maintenance and is therefore a violation, provided the other .elements are
satisfied. Armed with this ~efinition, the district court held that display biasing (the
primary monopoly leveraging complaint in this case) could be construed as
unreasonable. [d. at 1474. It unreasonably injured consumers by harnessing them with
more expensive flights because the reservation attendant did not realize that other less
expensive flights were available. [d.
144. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). A CRS is a group of on-line terminals con
taining booking information to which travel agents subscribe based upon a per booking
fee.
145. [d.
146. [d.
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services (by having the most travel agent subscribers), they were
also the most desirable. 147 Initially, the services charged extremely
high rates, but they subsequently became subject to government
regulation, leading to much more reasonable and uniform rates. 148
As a rule, smaller airlines would subscribe to every CRS in order to
receive maximum exposure. 149 Because the services charged a per
booking rate, as opposed to a flat rate, it was not financially bur
densome for airlines to subscribe to multiple services. 15o Although
the per booking charges were minimal, the smaller airlines were
unhappy that the larger airlines could demand any fee. Conse
quently, they brought an antitrust action claiming that the larger
airlines were "leveraging" their dominance in the CRS market in
order to gain an advantage in the air travel market.1 51 The plaintiff
small airlines argued that by having control over the smaller air
lines' information in the CRS market, the larger airlines could mold
and control the plaintiffs' place in the air travel market.1 52 The
smaller airlines charged that the larger airlines engaged in display
biasing. Display biasing involved giving the defendant's own flights
more desirable positions on the terminal screens, thereby cheating
customers out of potentially less expensive flights.1 53 The plaintiffs
also charged that the defendants were denying them access to an
"essential facility,"154 another antitrust claim which the court dis
missed, but which overlaps slightly with the monopoly leveraging
claim.155
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 539.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Air Passenger
Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig.), 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1474 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
For a detailed discussion of CRS problems, see Larry Locke, Flying the Unfriendly
Skies: The Legal Fallout Over the Use of Computer Reservation Systems as a Competi
tive Weapon in the Airline Industry, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 219 (1989).
154. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 539.
155. For an example of a classic essential facilities case, see Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). In that case, Otter Tail Power Company provided
"retail" electrical services to towns. Some towns requested that they receive "whole
sale" services and provide the retail aspect themselves. Otter Tail denied such requests
and the Supreme Court held that this was a denial of essential facilities because Otter
Tail's services could not be duplicated. With respect to Otter Tail's denial of wholesale
services, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he record makes abundantly clear that Otter
Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or
gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 377. The Alaska Airlines court dismissed the applicability of Otter Tail to
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Catlin, had al
ready reserved judgment on the question of monopoly leverag
ing. 156 In Alaska Airlines, the court moved one step further and
refuted the Berkey Photo decision, declaring it irreconcilable with
the expressly stated section 2 offenses. 157 Although Griffith pro
vided major support for the reasoning in Berkey Photo, the Alaska
Airlines court began by dismissing it in a footnote. 15s The court
noted that because Griffith concerned a section 1 offense, it con
tained broad language which was not controlling. 159 The court then
cited to Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 160 decided after
Berkey, to reinforce the distinction between section 1 and section 2
offenses. 161 In the same footnote, the court also dismissed the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Kerasotes 162 "for the same reasons"163 it re
jected Berkey Photo.t 64
the case at hand. The court stated "[a]s the Supreme Court indicated, Otter Tail Power
had both attempted to monopolize and had succeeded in monopolizing the downstream
market for 'retail' electric services." Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 543 (citing Otter Tail
Power Co., 410 U.S. at 377-79).
Prior to examining the leveraging claims the court addressed the essential facilities
claims. This part of the court's discussion merits attention in order to demonstrate the
link between "essential facilities" and the "monopoly leveraging" doctrines. The court
stated that "the essential facilities doctrine imposes liability when one firm, which con
trols an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service
that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first." [d. at 542. Like
monopoly leveraging, this represents a § 2 offense because it applies to the unilateral
conduct of an actor and it involves two distinct markets.
Primarily because the defendants did not possess the requisite power to eliminate
downstream competition (in the court's estimation), the court dismissed this initial
claim. [d. at 546. In this case, airline flights were the downstream market because they
flowed from or were downstream from the CRS market. Because the smaller airlines
could have withdrawn from the questionable CRS networks and still have survived, the
larger airlines were therefore not in control of the air travel market. Such a condition
precludes an essential facilities claim. The court noted that the ability of the smaller
airlines to pull out of the given CRS "severely limited" United or American in their
ability to abuse the downstream market. [d. at 545.
Furthermore, the court asserted that without the power to eliminate competition
the plaintiff must show either monopoly or attempted monopoly, a theme which carries
over into the court's analysis of monopoly leveraging. Id. at 546.
156. Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986).
157. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549.
158. [d. at 547 n.16.
159. [d.
160. 467 U.S. 752 (1984); see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
161. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16.
162. Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom., G.K.C. Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National
Amusements, Inc., 490 U.S. 1087 (1989); see supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
163. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16.
164. Although this appears to be relatively terse treatment for such important
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied quite heavily
upon Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. ,165 which
was also decided after Berkey Photo. Most importantly, Aspen Ski
ing reinforced the notion that the presence of "predatory" conduct
was necessary for a violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act. l66
The court used Aspen Skiing to strengthen the proposition that
"the Sherman Act does not attack every monopoly."167 The Alaska
Airlines court emphasized the conduct which survives scrutiny
under the Sherman Act. 168 Conversely, the Berkey Photo court
merely stated that some monopolies are tolerated, but not
cherished. 169
While Berkey Photo began with the proposition that monopoly
power is "'inherently evil,' "170 no such language exists in the
Alaska Airlines opinion. The court actually praised the efficient
monopoly, downplaying its danger by explaining it "will continue
only so long as the monopolist sustains a level of efficiency or inno
vation such that its rivals cannot effectively compete."171 The court
explained that efficient monopolies would police themselves and
that they were beyond the reach of the Sherman Act due to their
economic efficiency.l72 The Alaska Airlines court stressed that
these "efficient monopolies" exist absent the predatory practices
described in Aspen SkiingP3
The Ninth Circuit strengthened this discussion of acceptable
monopolies by pointing to "natural monopolies."174 The court sug
gested that governmental regulation, as opposed to judicial inter
vention, is the best way to deal with natural monopolies because the
legislature is better suited to making decisions regarding price conprecedent, the case did not add much to the reasoning already propounded in Berkey
Photo. The Sixth Circuit merely accepted the doctrine with little analysis. Also, Sixth
Circuit precedent is not binding on the Ninth Circuit.
165. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
166. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985)).
167. Id. The court also used another case from the Ninth Circuit, United States v.
Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990), to fortify its position.
168. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547.
169. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
170. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)); see supra notes 91-92
and accompanying text.
171. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547.
172. Id. at 549.
173. Id. at 547.
174. Id. at 548.
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trols.115 Throughout this discussion, the court made no reference to
the "evils" of monopoly. In fact, the court's statement that "[t]he
antitrust laws tolerate both efficient monopolies and natural mo
nopolies,"176 is the harshest anti-monopoly tone in the entire
Alaska Airlines opinion. Instead of dwelling, on the negative as
pects of monopolies, the Alaska Airlines court emphasized permis
sible monopolies and their positive aspects.
The court further explained that the elements of "attempted
monopolization" and "monopolization" were developed specifically
to differentiate between lawful and unlawful monopoly.177 The
court noted that any attempt to circumvent these requirements cer
tainly misinterprets the spirit of the law and wrongfully punishes
those who are undeserving of punishment. By concluding monop
oly leveraging is not anti-competitive conduct, but merely a benefit
of possessing an efficient monopoly, the Alaska Airlines court dis
agreed fundamentally with the Berkey Photo court.178 According
to the Alaska Airlines court, when natural and efficient monopolies
are permitted to continue, which is the effect of the Sherman Act
scheme, society must deal with any unpleasant side effects without
banning them outright. 179 The court attempted to equate monopoly
leveraging with the other monopoly consequences which are per
mitted, such as setting a high price, which is not anti-competitive in
and of itself.180 The court also appeared reluctant to stray from set
tled Ninth Circuit precedent and the Supreme Court cases decided
after Berkey Photo.1 81
175. [d. The Ninth Circuit cited Berkey Photo's own language regarding pricing
to arrive at this conclusion. "[J]udicial oversight of pricing policies would place the
courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory commission. We would be wise to
decline that function unless Congress clearly bestows it upon us." Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
176. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548.
177. [d. The court had relied upon this same basic argument in its discussion of
essential facilities. [d. at 546. It is apparent that the court was satisfied with the reach
of the traditionally established offenses.
178. [d.
179. [d. at 549. The Alaska Airlines court asserted that concerns for efficiency
outweighed any possible harm in this particular case. Another case where a regulated
monopolist "seeks to evade regulations which limit profits in the monopoly market by
creeping into adjacent, unregulated markets" would provide a wholly different scenario.
[d. at 549 n.17.
180. [d. at 548-49.
181. The court used Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984), to refute United States v. Griffith, although Griffith was fundamental to Berkey
Photo. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16. The court also used Aspen Skiing to
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Finally, the court declared that monopoly leveraging has the
inherent potential to backfire on the supposed monopolist. 1s2 By
pushing customers in the leveraged market too hard with these
techniques, the monopolist will only force the customer to look
elsewhere, thereby providing encouragement to competing firms.1s3
In the wake of this dissatisfaction, competing firms will be rejuve
nated with the belief that they can successfully challenge the holder
of monopoly power. 184
Other courts have approached the validity of monopoly lever
aging somewhat differently. The majority of courts, however, have
recognized that leveraging marks a departure from the expressly
stated offenses outlined in the Sherman Act.18S The Berkey Photo
court and its progeny opined that certain forms of unilateral con
duct deserved greater scrutiny. Conversely, the Alaska Airlines
court sought to provide certain protections for large corporations
acting unilaterally.
V.

ANALYSIS

The challenge in reconciling Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines
lies in the lack of definitive precedent from the Supreme Court.
Citing a gap of twenty years between Grinnell and Aspen Skiing,
one commentator has remarked upon the shortage of section 2 de
cisions by the high court. 186 Whatever the reasons for this lack of
precedent, legal practitioners are left with little guidance in evaluat
ing the status of possible section 2 offenses. ls7
Deference should be given to those firms acting unilaterally.
Furthermore, monopoly leveraging cannot possibly be a species of
an attempt to monopolize claim due to its failure to meet the strict
reinforce the need for predatory conduct which it noted was lacking in the case before
it. [d. at 547.
182. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549.
183. [d.
184. [d.
185. Most recently, the Third Circuit, in Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993) followed the Alaska
Airlines holding. The Third Circuit relied most heavily upon the differences between
§§ 1 and 2 outlined in the Supreme Court's Copperweld opinion to support its holding.
[d. at 206.
186. 3 Michael Malina, Supreme Court Update-1985, in ANTITRUST IN TRANSI.
TION 1073, 1074 (Milton Handler ed. 1991).
187. [d.; see also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical
Strategies by Dominant Firms, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (1992) (noting the difficulty
in formulating antitrust policy).
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attempt requirements. 188 Finally, leveraging not only fails to meet
the market power requirements for a monopoly claim, but it also
espouses a "use" element which is too strict for the vertically inte
grated competitor.
A.

Unilateral vs. Concerted Conduct

Unilateral conduct involves the conduct of a single firm
whereas concerted conduct involves multiple firms. The plain lan
guage of the Sherman Act indicates that concerted action receives
greater scrutiny because any "contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise"189 which results in a "restraint of trade"190 con
stitutes a violation under section 1. Even without a finding of ac
tual monopoly or intent to monopolize, concerted action which
merely restrains trade violates section 1. Under the section 2 for
mulation, however, unilateral activity may constitute a violation,
but only if the actor actually monopolizes or attempts to monopo
lize a market.1 91
The Supreme Court has addressed the different treatment of
unilateral and concerted conduct under the Sherman Act. Analyz
ing the language of the statute, the Court stated the Sherman Act
"leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct ... [even
though that conduct] may be indistinguishable in economic effect
from the conduct of two firms subject to [section] 1 liability."l92
The Court further stated "that Congress left this 'gap' [between sec
tions 1 and 2] for eminently sound reasons."193 The Supreme Court
noted that Congress made a "purposeful choice" to treat unilateral
and concerted conduct differently.1 94 The clear distinction between
188. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
189. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of this statute,
see supra note 3.
190. [d.
191. Section 2 reads "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop
olize ... shall be deemed guilty." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The attempt
to monopolize requires a specific intent coupled with a "dangerous probability" of suc
cess making it a far more difficult standard to meet than the § 1 "restraint of trade"
formulation. Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See supra note
12 and accompanying text. The plaintiff in a § 2 case must present stronger evidence of
market power. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090
(1992). Congress apparently displayed deference toward unilateral conduct by requir
ing this more difficult showing.
192. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984).
193. [d.
194. [d.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984) (stating "there is the basic distinction between concerted and independent ac
tion-a distinction not always clearly drawn by parties and courts").
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unilateral and concerted action raises concerns about analogizing
between multiple and single firm conduct. The Supreme Court
clearly expressed a desire to show deference to single firm conduct
but has accorded no such deference to concerted conduct. 195
Despite the differences in treatment between unilateral and
concerted conduct articulated by the Supreme Court, for purposes
of a monopoly leveraging violation under the Sherman Act, it ap
pears that unilateral conduct and concerted conduct need to be
treated in the same manner. At least one commentator has sug
gested the soundness of such an approach.196 This theory asserts
that the "gap" between sections 1 and 2 needs bridging. When a
monopolist possesses monopoly power in one market and is in
volved in other markets, the monopoly leveraging approach as
sumes that the monopolist should be held to a standard similar to
the "restraint of trade" in section 1. This methodology, however,
contradicts Supreme Court precedent and uses the logic that if not
for the differences in sections 1 and 2 these situations would cer
tainly constitute offenses. The Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp. refuted that logic by recognizing the
validity and necessity of the gap.197 The language of the Sherman
Act1 98 and recent Supreme Court pronouncements199 indicate that
courts should proceed cautiously and not attempt to eliminate the
deferential treatment of single firms in contravention of the statute.
Any attempt at bridging the "gap" contravenes the Sherman Act as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Both the Berkey Photo and the Alaska Airlines courts appear
195. Copperweld, 467 u.s. at 775.
196. See Hawk, supra note 13, at 1156-59. Professor Hawk distinguishes carefully
between what he calls "Griffith" situations and "non-Griffith" situations. A Griffith
situation involves an entity which has monopoly power in one market and misuses that
power in a second market (basically the same situation as Berkey Photo). He contends
that the Griffith operator should be held to a higher standard than a two market com
petitor that does not have a monopoly in either market. In his view, courts had already
been eager to attack such situations and establishing this new "Griffith" standard would
eliminate haggling over traditional "attempt" terms such as "specific intent" and "dan
gerous probability." Id. at 1158. He finally rationalizes this position by explaining that
"if not" for the differences in §§ 1 and 2, this would certainly be a violation of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 1159; see also 2 Michael Malina, The Antitrust Jurisprudence of the
Second Circuit, in ANTITRUST IN TRANSITION, supra note 186 at 817, 831 (praising the
soundness of Judge Kaufman's opinion).
197. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984).
198. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of these
sections, see supra notes 3-4.
199. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
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to agree that if the conduct in question were performed by multiple
entities, it would clearly violate the Sherman Act.2OO However,
courts and commentators have noted that Congress consciously
placed a gap between monopoly power based on concerted conduct
and monopoly power based on unilateral conduct. 201 The court in
Alaska Airlines proceeded on the premise that the gap between sec
tions 1 and 2 requires preserving, as evidenced by its reliance on the
expressly stated section 2 offenses. 202 Judge Kaufman in Berkey
Photo, on the other hand, suggested that the gap may need bridging
to fulfill the overall intent of eliminating anti-competitive
monopoly.203
From the Alaska Airlines opinion, it appears that the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon the differences
between the treatment of unilateral and concerted conduct sug
gested by Copperweld to reach the conclusion that monopoly lever
aging is not an offense under section 2 of the Sherman Act. One
commentator has suggested that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
Copperweld was misplaced because that case dealt with a section 1
violation. 204 Regardless of whether this is true, the Alaska Airlines
court used the recently expressed differences between sections 1
and 2 to quickly dismiss Griffith. 205 Because Copperweld was
200. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
201. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775
(1984) (explaining that the gap between §§ 1 and 2 should be allowed to continue);
Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1513 (1983), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986) (recognizing the theoretical gap in the Sherman Act). But
see, Hawk, supra note 13, at 1156-59 (asserting that the gap should be closed in certain
situations).
202. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549. In rejecting the Berkey Photo leveraging
doctrine the Third Circuit relied heavily upon Copperweld saying "we have the benefit
of Copperweld's [sic] explication of the Sherman Act's purposeful 'gap' in liability."
Fmeman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 206 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993).
203. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 272, 274.
204. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1255. Professor Sullivan stated:
nothing in the [Copperweld] opinion implies that a blatant, anticompetitive
attack by a monopolist on a related market passes scrutiny unless it creates a
new monopoly. Indeed, the Court in Copperweld did not evaluate the chal
lenged conduct to decide whether it would have been bad enough to run afoul
of section 2. The whole point of Copperweld was that defendant's conduct,
however bad, was not subject to antitrust evaluation; section 1 did not apply
because it was single firm conduct, and section 2 did not apply because there
was no showing of power.
[d.

205.

Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 774-77).
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clearly a section 1 case, its use by the Ninth Circuit to dismiss Grif
fith appears logically inconsistent. The court had dismissed Griffith
because it was a section 1 case, but it used Copperweld, also a sec
tion 1 case, to accomplish this end. 206 Although this complete dis
missal of Griffith seems potentially overbroad, the Alaska Airlines
court was following sound logic in recognizing the differences be
tween sections 1 and 2. By interweaving section 1's focus on the
actor's conduct (as opposed to market effect) into a section 2 of
fense, leveraging, as propounded in Berkey Photo, oversteps the
bounds established in Copperweld. Consequently, the Court of Ap
peals for the Ninth Circuit correctly realized that leveraging fails to
consider adequately the question of market power in the relevant
market.207
B.

New Section 2 Offense?

A critical question exists as to whether Berkey Photo's monop
oly leveraging was meant to be a completely new offense or just a
species of an "attempt" claim.208 Arguments on both sides revert
back to the discussion on legislative intent concerning the role of
the courts in shaping new doctrine. 209 If Congress merely intended
for the courts to define the elements for each of the three enumer
ated offenses of section 2, the. appropriateness of the Berkey Photo
doctrine should be challenged because leveraging exceeds the spe
cific requirements for any of the enumerated offenses. 210
In Senate debate, Senator Sherman asserted that deciding be
tween lawful and unlawful combinations "must be left for the courts
to determine in each particular case."211 This language bestows lib
erallinedrawing power upon the courts, but it addresses combinaGriffith contained some very broad language with regard to the use of monopoly
power. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). The Griffith Court stated
"monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil
and stand condemned under § 2 [of the Sherman Act]." Id.
206. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 774-77).
207. Id. at 548.
208. One case suggested the importance of this question by stating, "[i]t is in this
light [the type of offense being created] that the question of whether 'monopoly lever
aging' is a 'new' [s]ection 2 offense - as opposed to being some variant on one of the
original three offenses - may be of greatest significance." Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacra
mento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1515 n.14 (E.D. Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1103 (1986).
209. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
210. See Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments-1979, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 9 n.61 (1981).
211. 21 CONGo REC. 2455 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 122.
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tions and not single firm conduct. In light of the recognized
differences between unilateral and concerted conduct,212 this lan
guage loses some of its persuasiveness as a grant of discretion to the
courts. In section 2, Congress enumerated three specific offenses213
and the courts should not circumvent this formulation. 214 It is one
thing to interpret what fits within a certain category, but it is quite
another to create an entirely new category of offense.
Generally, the United States Supreme Court adheres strictly to
the three offense format explicitly outlined in the Sherman Act and
has refrained from discussing specific doctrines such as monopoly
leveraging. 215 Therefore, it is helpful to examine monopoly lever
aging in terms of the expressly stated offenses. The offense of mo
nopoly under section 2 contains the requirements of possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and "the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power."216 The monopoly leveraging doc
trine fails to meet the first requirement because the attacked mo
nopolist admittedly does not possess monopoly power in the
relevant leveraged market. The Supreme Court has also defined
the necessary elements for an attempt claim. Unlike straight mo
nopolization which only requires that the actor have the intent to
perform the act which results in monopolization, "attempt" claims
require that the actor have a "'specific intent' to accomplish the
forbidden objective."217 This accepted rule 218 establishes a more
difficult hurdle for attempt claims because the market itself has not
yet been monopolized. The courts therefore focus more closely
upon the actor's conduct to find the violation rather than focusing
solely on market impact. To view monopoly leveraging as a species
212. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
213. 15 U.S.c. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of the statute,
see supra note 4.
214. See Robinson, supra note 210.
As a matter of antitrust policy, such a conclusion [leveraging as an offense] is
not difficult to accept; leveraging of monopoly power to gain an edge in a
second market shares the vice of unlawful tying arrangements in that it in
troduces an alien factor into the competitive milieu in the second market. But
it is difficult to reconcile such a theory with the language of § 2, which con
demns only monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monop
olize any part of commerce ....
[d. at 9 n.61.
215. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1233.
216. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2089
(1992); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
217. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
218. See, e.g., id.; Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,396 (1905).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

140

[Vol. 16:111

of an attempt claim merely places the relaxed requirements219 of
leveraging claims sharply at odds with the heightened standard pro
vided for attempt claims.
Since the Berkey Photo opinion, a number of courts have ad
dressed the issue of monopoly leveraging as a distinct offense under
section 2.220 Because the Berkey Photo discussion of section 2 was
general in nature, one court has suggested that this indicated the
Berkey Photo court's desire to create a new offense,221 and that if
the Berkey Photo court had meant for leveraging to fall within one
of the existing groups it would have examined those traditional of
fenses more carefully.222 More recently, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit discussed monopoly leveraging under the rubric
of an "attempt" claim, suggesting that it was merely a variation of
existing doctrine. 223 Other courts' determinations have not been
dispositive of the issue and leave doubt as to whether leveraging
should be considered a new section 2 offense.224 The Berkey Photo
court's failure to specify the approach it took towards monopoly
leveraging leaves open the question of what must be proved to
make out a successful claim. 225
219. See Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir.
1985). For a list of the requirements, see supra note 123.
220. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
221. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1516
(E.D. Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. lI03 (1986). The court stated:
The [Berkey Photo] court evinces from its discussion a general rule regarding
the legal limitation on monopoly power, and announces that that rule is vio
lated any time monopoly power is used to gain a competitive advantage. This
analytical process clearly speaks to the purpose of the statute itself rather than
the limits and possibilities of any pre-existing statutory offense, and thus seems
to be describing a new and different way of proceeding under the Act-that is,
a new [s]ection 2 offense.
[d.
222.

[d.

223. ·Thin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990).
224. See Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d
135, 137-38 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom. G.K.c. Mich. Theatres v. National
Amusements, Inc., 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), where the court noted that the plaintiffs had
made out a satisfactory "leveraging" claim. The court, however, failed to indicate
whether this was a separate offense or merely a species of offense. See also Grand
Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985). Although the
court outlined the elements for a leveraging claim based upon its Second Circuit prede
cessor, Berkey Photo, the court did not clearly indicate whether leveraging was a dis
tinct offense. Id.
225. Grason Electric, 571 F. Supp. ·at 1516. The court suggested that leaving the
determination ambiguous creates as many problems as it solves. Leveraging leaves
open the question of what the defendant is charged with and what elements need to be
proven to secure a conviction. Id.
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Some courts have assumed that monopoly leveraging is a dis
tinct offense. 226 Conversely, other courts have placed leveraging
under the existing "attempt to monopolize" category of section 2.227
The cases have split rather evenly on the issue. An examination of
the cases reveals that generally those viewing the doctrine favorably
either do not discuss the issue or place it in an existing category.228
Conversely, those cases with a more skeptical view toward leverag
ing approach the doctrine as creating a new and distinct offense
under section 2.229 Several possible explanations exist for this
polarity.
Perhaps the Berkey Photo court recognized that the leveraging
doctrine would gain more widespread acceptance if it appeared to
fall within one of the traditional monopoly categories. Other courts
that eventually followed the doctrine may have also taken this posi
tion as a means of more easily defending their theoretical positions.
On the other hand, courts opposed to the monopoly leveraging
doctrine are inclined to make it appear more divergent from the
expressly stated offenses. A court which found the leveraging doc
trine unacceptable on theoretical grounds could argue that leverag
ing creates a new offense in an attempt to fortify its position.
Consequently, a court which disagreed with Berkey Photo would
have an initial argument that serves to weaken the doctrine, prior to
asserting other more substantive arguments. The Ninth Circuit's
primary arguments for rejecting monopoly leveraging in Alaska
Airlines centered around a reversion back to enumerated offenses,
226. See Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d
577 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Here, the court stated "[a]ssuming arguendo that leveraging is a
distinct section 2 offense." Id. at 586. This indicates that the court may have viewed
leveraging as a separate offense. See also Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford
Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990). In language similar to that used in
NCAA the court observed "we assume that monopoly leveraging is an independent § 2
violation separate from monopolization and attempted monopolization." Id. at 149
n.17. This indicates that the court desired to address leveraging as a distinct violation.
227. See Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
The court addressed monopoly leveraging under the heading of "Monopoly Leveraging
as an Attempt to Monopolize." Id. at 1566. The court noted that monopoly leveraging
merged into attempt. This theory appears to be a misinterpretation by the court of pure
leveraging. But see M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982). In
mentioning the possible claims for monopoly the court said, "[a]mong those forms is the
theory that a firm violates § 2 by using its monopoly power in one market to gain an
unwarranted competitive advantage in another." Id. at 1305-06. The court did not ex
plicitly state that leveraging was a separate offense and proceeded more as if it fell
within a traditional category.
228. See supra notes 224 & 227.
229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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making it extremely effective to categorize leveraging as a distinct
offense that wandered outside traditional boundaries. 230 The
Alaska Airlines court correctly focused on the parameters of the
traditional offenses under section 2.
The stringent requirements for attempt to monopolize claims
preclude leveraging from falling within this traditional category.231
Furthermore, under the strictest interpretation, leveraging also
does not appear to meet both elements of a straight monopolization
claim. The broad language in United States v. Griffith indicates that
any use of monopoly power "to gain a competitive advantage ... is
unlawful."232 However, when this language is read in the context of
a necessity for monopoly power in the relevant market,233 the pos
sibilities for fitting leveraging into a section 2 offense are con
stricted. Without a clear niche, monopoly leveraging falls into a
new category of offense and should therefore be rejected. Conse
quently, the Alaska Airlines court adopted the correct approach in
relying upon the more traditional offenses. Even with the broad
language of Griffith,234 the Berkey Photo leveraging doctrine fails
to satisfy anyone traditional offense. Congress did not intend to
allow the judiciary to create offenses outside the traditional ones.
C.

What Does Monopoly Mean?

Finding a niche for leveraging in the statutory scheme is a diffi
cult task. If leveraging is viewed as a monopoly (as opposed to an
attempt) offense, interpretational difficulties still arise. The Sher
man Act and its legislative history provide minimal guidance in de
termining what actions should constitute monopoly. The plain
language of the statute uses only the generic term "monopoly."235
During Senate consideration, Senator George Edmunds of Ver
mont read from the Webster's dictionary on the definition of "mo
nopoly."236 This discussion directly followed the interchange on
230. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d, 536, 548 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). The court retreated into § 2 offenses saying
"[t]hus, the elements for ... 'monopolization' and 'attempted monopolization' are vital
to differentiate between efficient and natural monopolies on the one hand, and unlaw
ful monopolies on the other." Id.
231. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
232. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
233. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
234. See Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1253 (noting that Berkey Photo was based
upon Griffith).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of the statute,
see supra note 4.
236. 21 CONGo REC. 3152 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 293-94.
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efficient and natural monopolies. 237 Viewed as a whole, this in
terchange indicates the Senators knew "monopoly" was something
beyond the dictionary definition and needed development in the
courts.
The United States Supreme Court has established the require
ment of "exclusionary" or "predatory" conduct for a finding of mo
nopoly under the Sherman Act. 238 In United States v. E.!. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. ,239 the Court defined monopoly power as the
"power to control prices or exclude competition," reinforcing the
requirement of exclusionary conduct. 240 The monopolist, then,
must engage in conduct that is clearly anti-competitive in addition
to possessing monopoly power in the relevant market to complete
the violation. Setting "exclusionary" conduct as the boundary cre
ates the correct amount of protection for the large integrated com
pany that competes in many markets. It recognizes the difference
between conduct based upon efficiency and that based upon unlaw
ful activity. This relatively strict standard provides the proper bal
ance and insures that innocent competitors will not fall prey to
broadly construed standards.
Applying the stricter standard described above, it is apparent
that the Alaska Airlines court had the better approach to leverag
ing. The Berkey Photo court prohibited the "wielding" or "exer
cise" of monopoly power even when that power was legitimately
acquired. 241 Judge Kaufman asserted that only those activities
which are performed by a monopolist would be subject to liabil
ity.242 At least one commentator, however, has criticized this asser
tion contending that it creates an undesirable gray area of
The dictionary definition given in the Senate was "2. To engross or obtain by any means
the exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to any place, or with any country or
district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade." [d. at 293.
237. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
602 (1985).
239. 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
240. [d.
241. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
242. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093. The court noted:
A classic illustration is an insistence that those who wish to secure a firm's
services cease dealing with its competitors .... Such conduct is illegal when
taken by a monopolist because it tends to destroy competition, although in the
hands of a smaller market participant it might be considered harmless, or even
"honestly industrial."
[d. at 275.
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interpretation. 243 The strongest arguments presented by the Ninth
Circuit addressed the rather loose requirements for anti-competi
tive conduct offered in Berkey Photo. The Alaska Airlines court
attacked the differences between Berkey's "exercise" of monopoly
power and traditional "predatory" requirements. 244 The Berkey
243. See Robinson, supra note 210.
While [exercise of monopoly power] is not specifically addressed by Judge
Kaufman, the whole thrust of his opinion seemingly requires a showing that
monopoly power has been used in order for a lawful monopolist to be gUilty of
the offense of monopolization. On the other hand, the court at least leaves
open the question of whether a monopolist "monopolizes" if he engages in
false advertising to the detriment of his competitors-an act that obviously
can be, and typically is, committed by companies lacking monopoly power. At
another point the opinion indicates that a monopolist does not run afoul of § 2
simply by advertising his products "unless the extent of this activity is so un
warranted by competitive exigencies as to constitute an entry barrier." Since
advertising by a large company that does not enjoy monopoly power can also
erect barriers to entry, does this suggest that Judge Kaufman does not neces
sarily regard the use of monopoly power as an essential element in every mo
nopolization case? Does he perhaps intend to apply a rule of anticompetitive
use as the index of illegality only in a "leveraging" case such as Berkey where
the claim is that the monopolist used his monopoly power in one market in
order to gain a competitive advantage in another?
[d. at 11 n.64 (citations omitted).
244. In exploiting the perceived weaknesses in the Berkey Photo opinion, the
Ninth Circuit quoted Berkey Photo's defense of high prices as not constituting anti
competitive behavior. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 549
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). Unlike the Berkey Photo court, the
Ninth Circuit noted that monopoly leveraging, like setting high prices, is just one of the
societal "cost[s] that we incur" by permitting monopolies to exist. [d. at 548. The syllo
gism proceeds as follows: The externalities associated with monopoly, like setting high
prices, are acceptable; Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275, monopoly leveraging is also one
of these externalities; therefore monopoly leveraging is acceptable. The court finished
the analysis by applying the same rationale for allowing high prices (incentive for new
competitors to enter the market because the buyers are discontented). Alaska Airlines,
948 F.2d at 548-49. The court stated: "Every time the monopolist asserts its market
dominance on a firm in the leveraged market, the leveraged firm has more incentive to
find an alternative supplier, which in tum gives alternate suppliers more reason to think
that they can compete with the monopolist." [d. at 549. But see, Sullivan, supra note
187, at 1237 ("Consumers in a monopolized market can observe the problem they face;
consumers in a competitively structured market into which a monopolist leverages
power cannot.") Of course this syllogism is only possible "in the absence of any mean
ingful, substantive distinction between monopoly leveraging and other consequences of
lawful monopoly." Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549. On the other hand, the Berkey
court agreed that high prices "invite[d] new competitors into the monopolized market"
but felt that leveraging was "an exercise of power over the market" as opposed to a
mere "consequence of size." Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274-75 & n.12. It has been
suggested that leveraging would be much easier to control than monopoly pricing be
cause injunctions would provide the proper relief. See Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1237.
To forbid leveraging does not present the severe problem of judicial adminis
tration that would arise if a court were to enjoin monopoly pricing. Courts can
readily control leveraging through equitable relief and effectively deter lever
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Photo court, however, remarked that certain benefits "are a conse
quence of size and not an exercise of power over the market,"245
indicating a realization that efficiency had long been recognized as
one of the safe harbors of the Sherman Act. The Berkey Photo
approach could be read to establish a presumption that the leverag
ing conduct is improper. 246 A competitor could then rebut this pre
sumption by a showing of efficiency. For this theory to work, one
must believe that monopoly is "'inherently evil' "247 and any use
thereof should be scrutinized. 248 On the other hand, the Alaska
Airlines court correctly utilized a presumption of propriety absent a
aging by treble damages or criminal sanctions. . .. Courts hesitate to forbid
conventional limit pricing due to problems in identifying and controlling it,
and also because limit pricing forces the monopolist to give up some of its
present "monopoly rents" in order to lengthen its tenure as a monopolist.
However, none of these constraints applies to leveraging.
[d. Absent "predatory" conduct, however, ease of control does not necessarily justify
granting relief. One must remember that the logical structure of the syllogism collapses
instantly absent a strong similarity between leveraging and other uses of monopoly
power.
Once again, the Berkey Photo view, drawing a distinction between pricing and
leveraging, appears rooted in what the court saw as the parallel to tying cases. Berkey
Photo, 603 F.2d at 275-76. Tying had been condemned by the Supreme Court as being
unlawful per se. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct.
2072,2079 (1992); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Conversely,
the Ninth Circuit viewed leveraging solely in its § 2 context allowing the court to con
clude (through the syllogism) that it was merely another permissible use of monopoly
power. Copperweld's language seems to suggest that this approach was more faithful to
the spirit of the divided sections of the Sherman Act although the policy arguments
from Berkey Photo certainly are tenable. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984). The strict interpretation seems more sound in light of
the Act's emphasis on separation and recent Supreme Court precedent, although the
Ninth Circuit could be seen as elevating form over substance.
245. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274.
246. [d. at 276.
247. [d. at 273 (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954». "Since monop
oly power itself is the target of § 2, it is unreasonable to suggest that a firm that pos
sesses such power in one [market] and uses it to damage competition in another market
does not 'monopolize' within the meaning of the statute." [d. at 276 n.15.
248. For a discussion of an opinion critical toward the practice of leveraging, see
Lawrence A. Sullivan & Anne I. Jones, Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging
Power from One Product Market to Another in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPET·
ITIVENESS 165 (Thomas Jorde & David Teece eds. 1992). "When a firm leverages power
held in one market into a different market, the initial inference ought to be that unrea
sonably restrictive and exploitive consequences will result." [d. at 174. But see, Frank
H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135
(1984). "No practice a manufacturer uses to distribute its products should be a subject
of serious antitrust attention. . .. It should make no difference whether the manufac
turer 'ties' products together in a bundle, employs full-line forcing or exclusivity
clauses, or uses reciprocity." [d.
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finding of "predatory" conduct. 249
Berkey Photo also suggests a unique standard for judging con
duct in a two market situation. When evaluating such a case, the
Berkey Photo court required that competition be "merely dis
torted,"250 a requirement clearly less stringent than any discussed
above. The Berkey Photo court reinforced its desire to place extra
restraint upon the holder of a monopoly, even if lawfully acquired.
Although Judge Kaufman provided a disclaimer to this rule for the
competitor who uses "efficient size,"251 the Ninth Circuit noted that
this gave little solace to the large and efficient competitor. 252 Be
cause a competitor has a lawful monopoly in one market, it should
not be held to a higher standard in another, related market. 253
Furthermore, the alleged monopolist's situation should be evalu
ated considering each market separately. If not, integrated compet
itors have a greater chance of suffering254 because they reach many
different markets and under the Berkey Photo rule their efficiency
could actually be a Sherman Act violation.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act and subsequent case
law indicate that the efficient monopolist should not be unduly bur
dened,255 and therefore efficient monopolies should not be consid
ered unlawful under sections 1 and 2.
D.

Effects of Image Technical Services

Recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dealt
with both section 1 and 2 claims. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc. ,256 the Court shed more light on its position
249. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
250. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275.
251. One commentator has remarked that "from the 1992 vantage point, Berkey
reads as a generally sound opinion well within the mainstream. It acknowledges the
importance of efficiency, even by monopolists, but does not suppose that courts must
trade everything else of value in the antitrust tradition to attain efficiency." Sullivan,
supra note 187, at 1256.
252. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548. "The anticompetitive dangers that impli
cate the Sherman Act are not present when a monopolist has a lawful monopoly in one
market and uses its power to gain a competitive advantage in the second market." Id.
253. Id.
254. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Air Passenger
Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig.), 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
"Monopoly leveraging is overly restrictive because it attacks unilateral conduct which
does not threaten monopolization. The danger is that such scrutiny will inhibit verti
cally integrated firms from vigorously competing in complementary markets." Id.
255. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
256. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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towards monopolies, possibly helping to resolve the conflict be
tween Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines. Although "leveraging"
was not raised specifically at the Supreme Court level,257 the Court
discussed some of the rules on monopoly power. The Supreme
Court relied upon the "willful acquisition or maintenance"258 re
quirement of Grinnell to disallow Kodak's motion for summary
judgment. Furthermore, the court held that there was evidence
"that Kodak took exclusionary action ... and used its control over
parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service mar
ket."259 Unlike Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines where the plain
tiffs admitted that the defendants lacked monopoly power in the
second market,260 the Supreme Court indicated here that Kodak al
ready had a "monopoly share" in the second market. 261 The court
did not approach this as a monopoly leveraging case. Instead, the
court viewed this as a case of Kodak possessing monopoly power in
two separate markets. 262 If anything, this decision serves to rein
force the guidelines established in earlier cases263 by relying upon
the traditional offense format. It also demonstrates that the Ninth
257. Id. At trial, the district court held that leveraging was not a "legally valid"
doctrine within the Ninth Circuit. The court further proclaimed that "plaintiffs have
not come forward with any facts to suggest that Kodak had attempted to leverage
power in that [service] market to gain a competitive advantage in another market."
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 WL
156332, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1990). The Ninth Circuit failed to deal with the lever
aging issue saying "[c]ertainly the focus of appellants' Section 2 claim has changed on
appeal." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc, 903 F.2d 612, 619-20 & n.7
(9th Cir. 1990); see DiResta et aI., supra note 123, at 78-79 (examining this case, the
authors stated that "[w]ith respect to the monopolization claims, the Ninth Circuit ig
nored the monopoly leveraging theory and analyzed the claims of Kodak's refusal to
deal as a monopolization or attempted monopolization.").
258. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2090.
259. Id. at 2091. As opposed to the display biasing in Alaska Airlines, the con
duct on Kodak's part in this case seems much more culpable. Kodak sold and serviced
their own brands of copier with their own parts which fit only their copiers. Certain
Independent Service Organizations (ISO) began competing with Kodak in the copier
servicing aftermarket. As a result, Kodak adopted a policy of knowingly refusing to sell
replacement parts to ISOs. Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 614. These policies are
more obviously exclusionary than the mere distortion presented in Alaska Airlines.
260. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948
F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
261. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2091.
262. "Respondents' evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts mar
ket and 80% to 95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, is,
however, sufficient to survive summary judgment under the more stringent monopoly
standard of § 2." Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2090.
263. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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Circuit's terse dismissal of Griffith might have been misplaced as
the Supreme Court still relied upon Griffith's supposedly broad lan
guage. However, the Supreme Court was not truly called upon to
apply the Griffith language to its fullest because the conduct in
question was clearly anticompetitive.
CONCLUSION

Monopoly leveraging has been viewed as both a Sherman Act
section 2 offense and beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. Both
approaches to monopoly leveraging are relatively sound, but they
are separated by a vast difference of opinion regarding monopoly
power in general. However, in light of recent Supreme Court pro
nouncements, monopoly leveraging cannot correctly be considered
a violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Alaska Airlines court noted that a certain amount of mo
nopoly power was acceptable and indeed desirable to maintain effi
ciency. The Berkey Photo court, to the contrary, believed that
monopoly was inherently "undesirable" and should only be allowed
to exist when it was built upon efficiency. This initial difference
molded the shape of the two opinions. The Alaska Airlines court
focused correctly upon the inherent differences between the first
two sections of the Sherman Act. The plain language of the Sher
man Act indicates that the touchstone of section 2 conduct should
be monopoly power, or a dangerous probability, in the relevant
market. Leveraging fails to clearly recognize this market power re
quirement. Furthermore, if leveraging is viewed as a completely
new offense, it oversteps the three offense format created by Con
gress. Although leveraging may seem sound as a matter of policy, it
does not distinguish sharply enough between lawful and unlawful
monopoly. The correct approach to monopoly requires power in
the relevant market and a "predatory" use of that power. The
Alaska Airlines court correctly noted that these requirements are
necessary to avoid wrongfully punishing the efficient competitor
and unnecessarily shielding the inefficient competitor.
James P. Puhala III

